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Flight simulator studies were conducted to _:>.al.,a_c.the piloting iroblems
_o,!. resulting from encounters with unusual atmc,tq)her"Ic,;l[:rucb.Lr_(e_,late in landing
ii _ approach. Simulated encounters with dlsturbance:., incluJtng c.::ampleaderived
! i!"I_ from accident data, provided the upportunity to _t_:_;y aJrclaft and pilotperforamnce. It was observed that substamtial dela.va "in pi!ut response to
• shear-induced departures from glide slope often ,.,er.ioucl.yamplified the
i[/Ii consequences of the encounter. In preliminary asse_;sm,::Dt,"an integrated
_ _ flight instrument display featuring fl_ght path as the pri_nary controlled
io_j_, element appeared to provide the means to minimize such dela>'_.
io.,}i IN_ RODUCTI Olq
!_ ._':
:::;'I' This paper reports findings from piloted simulator t.cst_; _.onducted to
':---_°:.{i obtain a better understanding of the piloting problems in,.!ucedby encounters,
=_4. in landing approach, with localized atmospheric d'tsturbat_ccssuch as wind shears
._...._ or downdrafts. This work was motivated by the _ncrea._:ed r-oncern, that followed
recent major accidents in which such disturbance'=:,_,c-reco_vinclngly identified
i-_:_, as the cause. The formulation and conduct of thes,: to-.ate';were influenced by
?°;;°_'_' the background gained during NASA consultation with the [_ational Transportation
°-o_" Safety Board (NTSB) during their investigat_.ons of thebc accidents.
o2".
]:';°_ To Illustrate the real hazards of wind shear, tbL: paper begins with a
__,i, review of two accidents from which descriptions oi the atmospheric disturbances
_'2'! were derived. The simulator tests, which _nclude ettcounters with similar wind
i:_of_ environments, are described. Data and observationb {_om these tests are
o_:: discussed. A flight instrument display prineip[,, r.!_a_ :_,i,pL_aruto have potential
_.:_,i for improving tolerance to disturbances in Junding apprc_r_ch "is then described.
.j_: Examples of Wind-Shear Accident,,:
,o:!': In December 1973, a DC-10 descended below,,}',.lJ.,!tl',ilthoil :It!approach to
4 Logan Airport (Boston), striking the approach Light _;t,md',rds short of the
_°"';'_. runway. The aircraft was destroyed, but fortunatc:l'.' tht:_c we_ c., no fatalities
._," The aircraft had performed a normal coupled 1l.,5 al'[',_,'_ t'..; w.ith uutothrottle,
"_'.' to an altitude of 60 m. At this point, while the pilot was completing his
='i}_ transfer from instrtm_ent to visual re[erence, hi. d_.e_g_pkd the autopilot, but
:,: left the autothrottle engaged. Data from the' tlight tt:cordtv indicate a
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subsequent 10-knot loss in airspeed, accompanied by an increasing sink rate.
Corrective action was first too little, then too late. This aircraft was
equipped with a very comprehensive digital flight data recorder (DFDR) that
provided the data defining the winds shown in figure i. The shear from a
strong tailwlnd component at I50-m altitude to a light headwlnd at 50 m caused
the aircraft to overshoot the desired approach speed, even though the auto-
throttle had reduced thrust to near flight idle. When the shear terminated,
the aircraft decelerated toward its target speed, and an undetected sink rate
developed. This wlnd-shear-induced accident is ,_oLable for its unusual
circumstances, not for the severity of the disturbance. At no time was the
performance capability of the airplane challenged -- in fact, it struck the
obstructions at a speed slightly above its reference approach speed.
In June 1975, at John F. Kennedy Airport (New York), during local thunder-
storm activity, several aircraft encountered severe shears late on final
approach. The last of these, a 727, hit approach light standards well short of
the runway, with catastrophic results. This aircraft was equipped with the
more common four-parameter foil recorder, providing insufficient data to define
winds with confidence. Six minutes before the accident, an L-lOll aircraft,
encountering a severe disturbance, had successfully executed a go-around. This
aircraft was equipped with a DFDR. The maneuvers of these two aircraft are
described in figure 2. Examining the flight paths and speed variations, the
observer is led to conclude that the disturbances experienced by the two
aircraft must have been very similar. Flight-path departure rates and speed
losses are nearly identical; however, the L-1011 had the good fortune to suffer
: its encounter at a higher altitude than did the 727. Note that, in each case,
downward departure from the ILS path preceded the sharp spced decay by about
6 sec. The pitch and thrust data, as well as angle-of-attack data, from the
L-lOll enabled the derivation of the winds that aircraft encountered (fig. 3).
These data are plotted to the same time reference as the previous figure. The
initial disturbance, a substantial downdraft of nearly i0 knots (i000 ft/min),
was followed by a 30-knot change in the along-track wind component This
disturbance has been hypothesized to result from a localized cold air downflow
=_ from a thunderstorm cell which, impinging on the surface, produced a high-
velocity horizontal flow radially outward. The meteorological situation at
New York at the time of the accident is analyzed in detail in reference I.
The wind profile (fig. 3) played a prominent role in the simulator program
discussed here.
Atmospheric disturbances of the type documented at New York have since been
_: identified in accidents at Denver (727 take-off) and Philadelphia (DC-9 go-
- around). Unfortunately, these airplanes were not DFDR equipped, and thus winds
cannot be determined with certainty. Further details of the Bo_ton, New York,
: " and Denver accidents can be found in references 2 through 4.
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",! SI_RN.ATOR TESTS
:_i: Objectives
L' The examples of shear encounters Just discussed contrast the case of
._ subtly induced sinking in the Boston accident with the awesome disturbances
It
experienced by the airplanes at New York. Fortunately, the severe cases are
._, rare, and warning is offered by the thunderstorms that breed them. It appears
:!_ that many other approach accidents and "near misses" have been induced by the
(_;, more modest type of disturbance. Thus it was intended that the simulator tests
i; explore encounters with a wide variety of shears. Answers to the following
_.! questions were sought:
-., I. In the present operational environment, what type and magnitude of
-._::!: disturbance _epresent an obvious hazard in landing approach?
ji'_
_:_ 2. What are the pilot factors that might escalate the effects of a modest
disturbance to produce an accident?
_'.:_ 3. What "onboard" means or techniques to reduce shear hazards appear
",_, worthy of development?
= ,_!'
_. Simulation
_ Facilit9 --The tests were conducted in the Ames Flight Simulator for
_'_. Advanced Aircraft (flg. 4). This facility includes a transport-aircraft-type
--%{! cockpit, large-amplltude cockpit motion, and a Redlfon TV-model board visual
_i. simulation system. During these tests, the pilot station incorporated a
=_i pneumatic "G-seat," on loan from the Air Force, which was intended to produce
_%_! the cues of sustained or lower frequency vertical accelerations.
_::_: Simulated aircraft --Airplane characteristics used in the simulator tests
i', were typical of a shor_:-range, twin-jet transport of the 737, DC-9 category.
_ The engines were assumed to be aft-fuselage-mounted, with thrust contributing
_ essentially no pitching mordent to the aircraft. A landing welght of 43,100 kg
_._.,' (95,000 ib) was used for all tests. Take-off static thrust per engine was
'. 62,274 N (14,000 ib) with 10-percent overboost available. The approach
-_,_ reference speed, Vref, or "bug" speed, was established as 125 knots, approxi-
_ _; mately 1.25 times the speed for maximum lift in l-g flight.
-- _ :°,
-_ i! " Cockpit controls and displays were conventional for transport category
i; aircraft. The attitude Indicator/horizonta] situation dlsp]ay (ADI-HSI)
_;.- were of the Sperry HZ-b configuration. The ADI included an "expanded" pitch
_, scale, a "fast-slow" indicator needle that was activated only for special
....._ tests, and a glide-slope deviatlon needle. The flight director need]es were
:_'!'_ driven by signals computed in the basic simulation computer. The pitch command
-_--_ signal did not employ the HZ-6 system logic; it was computed using the logic of
_. another commonly used flight director system. I'iteh attitude commands
= i. were derived from c summation of pitch attitude and beam error. Ibis system
:'_:'. h5
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incorporatod ;Dl,:;,l,_y ,_i f, :,v, f ;,._ ,,f f.l. b(_.qm-olrtJr JIll)ut .it mJddJe-lllarki.,r
passage.
An ILS-coup[,:,J :,,Jt,,l,i[,,t,,_,de.t ;;,_.:,v:l[lable In lh,: uimu]aLluu. Glide-
slope guldancu co,,F,ut:)t 1,u_ t(_ the a_Jtop;J,,t t.,.lu(h.d bt.am-erru[ rates derived
from vertical a,:colortltJ,,r, :Iml Wn.q ,,'l)re,_uut;It|%c Jn its capubllJtles of the
newer "autoland" :mtop!!,,,. .:,,._toms.
A "head-up" di;;p]:,,/:.y:_1,m__n;; u,Jed ]ate Jn the tests to evaluate modified
flight data display co:_,.'-I:t:_. The :wmbolo)[y (discussed later) was optically "
combined (with :_ m]r]:nr b_,;v.,,-pl, ttter) with t|le scene presented by the Redifon
visual simulatio. _;.::,, ,:,. '!l,: _,,mb__ned i_ulges were viewed through collimating
lenses.
VisiLi_ftL:_i_,.2,'t." .... -- I(_ouced visibility due to cloud or fog was
simulated eleetron]cal.ly. VisJbi[ity conditions as low as 30-m ceiling and
300-m visual rmlge (IWP) ".,2,t._:_!t,,IL_t_,dto the satisfac.tion of the pilots who
participated in the t:e:;_. i,_ thl_s Vv.ograP,, no cases of interrupted visibility
were simulated; th,. liV:'_,,,-.,:_dc..r;':.,,¢eJa'_ a!tJt,,de decreased.
W_nd elk{ Zi.(_q,h_.,,,..,.a/,:_:',:f;,-.: - A large ntm,ber of wind profiles (velocity
varying with a].titv<_,:[,.I,::_ 23'2 ,:..),.,_z<__ established for the program. Three
"logarithmic" profJl,,. _i,., t_.ti:.r[.: of widely di_pnrate atmospheric lapse
rates, constituted the ba,_(,. ,.,r,._,_rm:..On these shear profiles were superimposed
perturbations th:it d,.._i_,.,:. ',,',.*c ._],¢ar,,varying,, in altitude of initiation,
total amplitude, a,d g_a4J,,,t _i:,t,_ pc, unit altitude). Example:_ ot the along-
track sbear profiles ur;ed i,: tl:c t.e_:t;,t_r,.showu in fi_',ure 5. Crosstrack wind
profiles were defi,,,d :',- .cr_,_.o_-_)..t,.:fthe alon£,-track amplitudes. A
"40-r,ereent" czoscwJu,-_ ,._,-:i-c..:r,tl_o,,eeither the left or right was commonly
usel. In addition t, th,_,_.:_;.a,_.ro!/;-d altitude_4_ependent wind profiles, a
f_cslmile of the at_w,,.;.'-b<,.I_ .:Jt_iationsrecorded in the I,-1011 (discussed
earlier) was progr;_'_',,,d..;;.i _,n,_ti,.m ,.:]_d_staucc along the approach path,
initiating at a pvb_I _,'__c:'_-._.,:.L:',_.' t.,:, that o_L tlw 727 enLounter. Discrete
geographically detlncJ ,c!-r.,_,_.,).dr_Jt:- t,:er._also programmed. Simulated random
turbslence, approp._iot_. ,, ii:,,_.;i_,dcv.i;ditions, was superimposed on the shear
profiles.
TESTS
Six pilots wl,o t,',cu_'tl _1_. t_,'mt;pc,_t category ai._crnft participated in
:_ . the tests. After al,l._,d,,-i ,t, ia,,;ilfari._.att,n, with the simulated aircraft, they
each flew appvoathv_- _,_ .'l_ t., 5(.! ,iilfuztmt combinations oi atmospheric dis-
;' turbance and visfbt] it,. .'_IT i, _ :_ t,,v ,.,l,p_(_.:thus were manually controllod,
•: with flight directc.t _[_,! _l_._'e av_i].'lh.]e, t'bcp_sure to the Nuw York thunderstorm
profile was iuc[ud,,d x:,,l] ,l,.,_v i, ,..,,,'h i._lots o::perieucu ill tht2 simu],ltic, n
:_, while lie w¢ls tv,,l_] [,,_ ,{[:, ,::l .... _: ," Jt'v;_,,:I" I_.,agt_JtUdc , , :\ ._trt,tl)" ufft, rt v.'a.,:
.. made to create the. ¢ ,_L': ,., *.',,, i):l :'., r,. t._it_o:;_:, .',rod ;urt, rf;:, tl'..,t ,'l,.iI,,, tt.rJ:.,._l
:' the real etl(:_tll_It',:-
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'., All approaches were initiated at an altitude of about 300 m. Normal
_ control tower information regarding winds and visibility were transmitted to
the pilot. In most cases of large disturbance, tower reports of previous
. encounters were included. Use of conventional cockpit procedures, including
standard call outs, was encouraged. All pertinent pilot inputs and aircraft
-. responses were recorded, and the pilots' observations were recorded on voice
tape after each aplroach. At the end of the simulator exercise, and during a
brief opportunity t_everal months later, panel display modifications and several
electronic head-up display formats were evaluated subjectively in the presence
< of disturbances.
¢
[ RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
_ Aircraft Performance Potential
L.
-_!! Since the response to a shear encounter involves both pilot and aircraft
Z% performance, it is appropriate to preface a discussion of the results with a
_ review of aircraft performance capabilities assumed in these tests.
, Figure 6 represents an attempt to put in perspective the level of
."I_ disturbances experienced in the simulator relative to airplane performance
_ capabilities for both the generalized shear cases and for the New York profile.
Any point on this graph represents the duration of a "head-wlnd to tail-wind"
or "negative" shear of given rate of change (in knots/set). A useful approxi-
_. matlon is the equivalence, in terms of energy loss, of a 6-knot downdraft to
-"' l-knot/set shear. The top line defines the theoretical shear (or equivalent,r
_ combination of shear and downdraft) that can be tolerated without leaving the
!: glldepath or falling below stall-warnlng speed -- _ take-off thrust is instan-
_ taneously available at the onset of the disturbance and appropriate pitch
_ corrections are made. The lower curve represents the case of continued
![ approach thrust. The crosshatched area is an envelope of all the generalized
_<_ disturbances experienced in the simulator tests. Also indicated is the distur-
,_ bance level of the New York profile. It can be seen that the generalized shear
i: cases do not challenge the aircraft's performance potential. On the other hand,
" the New York profile leaves a comparatively small margin of performance.
_.,. Observations from Simulated Encounters
x_
_, The simulator exercises provided a wealth of observations -- and generated
c_ • some new questions -- regarding the significance in shear encounter of factors
.... such as training, individual piloting techniques, flight director loglc, and
;,:. concurrent transfer from instrument to visual references. However, most of
_L_, these points deserve more analysis and perhaps more experimentation before they
_ are reported. This paper is limited to a discussion of pilot response delays
-_ in wlnd-shear encounters and means to reduce those delays.
_'_ New York shea2, pro_'i_c -As indicated earlier, each of the six pilots in
_:' the simulator program suffered one well-conditloned encounter with a model of
i
_.
k
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the New York dewndraft-wlnd-shez, r phenomenon. In two of the six simulated
_; encounters, the aircraft descended to altitudes where they would have
+,i: encountered obstructions, in almo+'_Lexact duplication of the 727 accident. A
i_i third resulted in a near miss, and the rem;,Inlng three recovered wlth sizeable
:,_ terrain clearance. Figure 7 compare_ the sm_llest and the largest altitude
:'_' divergences seen in these encotu£Lers WhJ+le one of the simulated aircraft
" in effect "crashes," the other executes a successful go-around with a minimum
altitude of 40 m, only 20 m below ILS glide-slope altitude. The single most
"_i_. important difference in pilot response Is seen in the record of thrust. The
_t successful pilot perceived the sink rate induced by the downdraft and had added
substantial thrust by the time the shear was encountered. The pilot also
_'p' pitched the aircraft to regain near normal sink rate When the speed was seen
-?'L
+,_ to decay even farther, even with the In_tlal addition of power, take-off thrust
:!i was immediately applied• Speed did not fall below 124 knots. The other pilot
_+ made no significant response to the downdraft £n r_ sponse to the rapid
_, decrease in airspeed due to the shear, power was tentatively added. By the
_ time this response was recognized as inadequate, the aircraft was below 30 m,
_: in a high sink-rate condition, and ]0 knc,ts below approach reference speed --
_, + recovery was highly improbable.
_)! Further evidence of the value of quick response is seen in figure 8, which
-+_ illustrates the performance of an autopilot-autothrottle system in an encounter
._. wlth the same profile• Flight path was held tightly, but with significant
-°j+;'_ speed loss. The automatic systems perceived and acted with a very modest delay.
_>_; As indicated in figure 7, the pilot connot be counted on to act as effectively•
+Tf
...._; GenePa_zed 8heom p_,o_am - The performances recorded in the other dlstur-
'c'°_°, bancee can be reviewed for further evidence of the perception problem. As
%1_ might be expected, since these disturbances did not seriously challenge airplane
-?_'?,
_.? performance and the pilots were considered well warned, no simulated accidentJ
+++,. occurred. There was a small number of aborted approaches and several hard
+%$. landings. Subjective observations by the pilots were highly variable for the
-. lesser disturbances -- sometimes the disturbance was hardly noticed; at other
_'./- times, the same disturbance caused a very significant workload. The shears
j:_ that the pilots considered hazardous were of the highest amplitudes and
=_! gradients, for example, 15-20 knots in 30 m of altitude, and initiating below
"°" lO0-m altitude. Figure 9 shows characteristic values of speed and altitude
_+: losses for several levels of shear intcns+ty_. The shaded points represent the
+_ larger disturbances• Generally, these __evels of speed and flight-path
_,. deviation do not seem large or dangerous; however, if they are considered to
=_+_i[ occur very low in the approach, at ti_-c_sin low visibility, the hazard is moreapparent. The observation can be mode that the energy losses represented in
_: these excursions represent roughly 75 percent of the energy loss in the dlstur-
_i' ' bance input This would indicate delay ih effective countering of this loss_,.. _,.. : •
+_+._'.. by the pilot.
...._,+::i Figure i0 illustrates examp]+_ _csl,on_,ctimes _or thrust and pitch inputs
ii+!_ From the data represented by tht _Irclcd p_,it+t+,a wide variation of responses? is seen. This mlgl_t b expect,_d duc to ,_Jllc,-_ t_c_,_In rates of onset of the
:+t: disturbance, as well as variations iu lltght condition at the point of onset
_-_.:,,,,+_i '
•+>+"__++,
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Initial thrust _esponses are seen within 3 to 4 see, indicating tight monitor-
ing of airspeed. However, pitch attitude increases required to arrest the
increased sink rate occur 6 to ]0 sac after shear Jnltlatlon, indicating that
flight-path angle or rate-of-descent divergences are slow to be recognized,
'i
D
_: "he response lags shown for the simulated New York shear encounters are,.
ev re pronounced. The quickest responses were exhibited by the pilot that
s .aneously added thrust and pitched up within 5 sec of the disturbance
"_ onset. The delays in thrust addition are presumed due to the fact that the
initial disturbance was a downdraft that did not create an immediate speed
decay. The delays in pitch response are more surprising in view of the immedl-
_: ate increase in sink rate induced by the downdraft.
Means for Improving Fllght-Path Control
These observations of performance in shears led to the conclusion that
conventional displays do not provide the pilot with the means for uninterrupted
--s.
awareness of his flight path, and that visual cues outside the aircraft
can also be tenuous. As indicated earlier, the tests were concluued with
_ evaluations of display concepts aimed at improving the pilot's capability to
control speed and flight path in strong disturbances. By far the most eneour-
i aging results were obtained using the electronic head-up display equipment
-:! available to the simulator to create integrated dlsplays of various conflgura-
• tions. The format described in figure 11, which has been the subject of very
brief experience in the simulator, appears to essentially eliminate the path
__i and speed perception delays demonstrated with conventional displays• In
_i addition to the fixed airplane symbol and moving horizon, the display includes
_ the following elements: a runway symbol, in approximate perspective, with a
._ touchdown reference point; a glide slope angular error indication, referenced
_ to a negative three-degree pitch scale index; a flight-path symbol, referenced
._ to the horizon; and a speed error indication referenced to the airplane symbol•
! The effectiveness of the display in reducing time delays in the perception
_ of flight-path changes results from the fact that the flight-path indicator
_' can be substituted for the airplane symbol as the primary controlled element
_ To correct the flight situation illustrated, the glide-slope line is simply
-_i tracked with the flight-path symbol, resulting in a convergence as indicated
_. in figure 12. In the experiments, the fllght-path information was assumed to
!_ be inertlally derived, and a small component of lagged pitch rate was added to
!i compensate for the normal time lag between attitude and flight-path response.
The speed error symbology was well received and could usually be sensed in
. peripheral vision while concentrating on the flight-path symbol.
Several i,oints regarding this display concept must be discussed. The
_, concept of flight path as the primary element is not original here; it is
"i' utilized in a well publicized commercial HUD system. The format shown is not
-_'_ a developed display. _q_ile it demonstrates effectiveness in tracking the glide
"_ slope, it is inadequate for lateral guidance without additional information.
_. There is no reason that the concept cannot be used in a panel-mounted display.
_: 69
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_', CONCLUSIONS
•> Analysis of simulator data and accident records indicates that the
" consequences of wind-shear encounters are seriously aggravated by delays In
;. perception of speed and flight-path divergences when conventional cockpit
,- displays or visual references are used. The significance of these delays is
.ii apparent when piloted performance is compared with the performance of a modern
,; autothrottle system in the same disturbance. Cockpit display concepts,
,'' integrating flight-path and speed information, hold promise of eliminating delays --'
z in pilot perception and are worthy of concerted development efforts.
, •-L
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